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THE NEW MODEL-AN ANALYSIS OF
THE APHA-PHS RECOMMENDED HOUSING
MAINTENANCE AND OCCUPANCY
ORDINANCE*
DAVID F. POLATSEKt
The primary governmental interest at stake is to prevent even the unintentional
development of conditions which are hazardous to public health and safety. Be-
cause fires and epidemics may ravage large urban areas, because unsightly condi-
tions adversely affect the economic values of neighboring structures, numerous
courts have upheld the police power of municipalities to improve and enforce such
minimum standards even upon existing structures. Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
Almost twenty years ago, Congress recognized that the achievement
of decent housing for all Americans was a most important national
objective. With the passage of the Housing Act of 1949,1 the Federal
Government undertook to offer financial assistance to cities and towns
across the country; but it was understood that in at least one vital
area, the conservation or rehabilitation of existing housing, primary
responsibility must be borne by local jurisdictions.2 These local gov-
ernments were called upon to enact and enforce ordinances for the
protection of the public health, safety and welfare, generally known
as "housing codes."
To assist the localities in this endeavor, the American Public Health
*The views expressed herein are those of the author and should not be under-
stood as expressions of any official positions.
fA.B., Western Reserve University, 1962; L.L.B., Harvard University, 1965; At-
torney-Advisor to the Department of Housing and Urban Development; formerly
Attorney-Advisor to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
1. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 413 (codified in scattered sections
of 12, 42 U.S.C.).
2. S. Res. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
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Association promulgated A Proposed Housing Ordinance,3 which
was released in 1952. This prototype has served as the basis of much
local legislation in the years between its publication and the present.
Until recently, it did not appear necessary to effect any substantial
changes in what had for so long served as an essential reference for
legislators.
Appearances, however, can be deceiving, as we have become pain-
fully aware in the past few years, when the magnitude of our urban
problems has surfaced in a sudden and dramatic fashion. It is now
dear that in spite of our efforts, substantial numbers of our citizens
still live in the midst of substandard housing and inadequate sanita-
tion, which are as inimical to social well-being as they are damaging
to health. When the last housing census was taken in 1960, it was
estimated that almost twenty-eight per cent of the housing units then
existing were without one or more essential plumbing facilities, or
else could be classified as deteriorating or delapidated.4 There are
indications that in at least some parts of the country the situation may
have worsened substantially since the time of this study of its scope.5
The frustration produced by life under such circumstances has been
cited by some observers as a factor contributing to the repeated civil
disorders which have disrupted the peace of American cities.o Cer-
tainly, some of this frustration seems attributable to the problems of
lax or haphazard enforcement of housing codes and to a continuing
lack of attention to the conservation and rehabilitation of existing
housing.
Together with a deepening environmental crisis, the past fifteen,
years have witnessed numerous significant developments in the physi-
cal and social sciences, and in the law of the land. In recognition of
the availability of new techniques for the solution of old problems,
the American Public Health Association, with the assistance of the
United States Public Health Service, determined to modify and mod-
ernize its previous publication. The APHA-PHS Recommended Hous-
3. AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, INC., COMMITTEE ON THE Hy-
GIENE OF HouSING, A PROPOSED HOUSING ORDINANCE (New York, 1952).
4. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 730 (1967).
5. Hearings on the Federal Role in Urban Affairs Before the Subcommittee on
Executive Reorganization of the Senate Committee on Government Operations,
89th Cong., Ist Sess., 148, cited in REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY Commis-
SION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 468 (Bantam Books ed. 1968).
6. See testimony of Senator Charles Percy, Hearings on Urban America:
Its Goals and Problems, Before the Subcomm. on Urban Affairs of the Joint
Economic Comm. of the United States Congress, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 178.
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ing Maintenance and Occupancy Ordinance7 was therefore released
on a one year's trial basis on July 1, 1967. The ordinance takes novel
approaches in combatting housing blight. Already, some of its pro-
visions have been made useless or at least have been placed in serious
doubt by the decisions of those courts which must constantly refine
the meaning of the Constitution. Other suggestions are as yet largely
untested, although hopefully they will generate the interest which
often accompanies innovation. But a beginning has been made in
applying the experience of the last fifteen years to the preparation
of a housing code.
No attempt will be made here to review the substantive portions of
this code, this being the province of an expert in urban sanitation.
The administrative and enforcement sections of the ordinance, how-
ever, may be grouped generally under five subjects: right of entry and
inspection; the gathering and use of evidence; the licensing of mul-
tiple dwellings; administrative procedure; and financing. It is with
reference to these subject headings that this portion of the ordinance
will be reviewed.
I. RiGHT oF ENTRY AND INSPECTION
In order to be useful in protecting the public health and safety, a
housing code must provide for a plan of inspection which extends far
beyond a mere response to individual complaints. Prophylaxis for
existing housing envisions periodic inspection of whole neighborhoods
or segments of the community. This method of code enforcement has
raised a number of Constitutional questions which even yet have not
been fully resolved, although the Supreme Court has quite recently
indicated that the law governing inspections is far more limiting than
was once believed. Effecting entry of a private dwelling to search for
violations of a housing code provides a focus for the conflict between
two of the great concepts of popular government: the right of the
community to safeguard the public health, safety or welfare, often
called the "police power," and the right of the individual to be secure
from unwarranted intrusions by government officials-the so-called
"right to privacy." An understanding of the nature of this conflict
and of the attempts of the courts to reconcile the two doctrines has
7. APHA-PHS RECOMMENDED HOUSING MAINTENANCE AND OCCUPANCY OR-
DINANCE, (Revised First Action Copy November 1, 1967) [hereinafter cited af
APHA-PHS Code].
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
become necessary for anyone involved in the drafting or enforcing of
a housing code.
It is on the basis of the police power that the State is empowered to
devise and administer legislation governing the repair, condition, and
sanitation of local housing. While the exact nature of the police power
has never been defined with precision, a California court has called
it "the power inherent in a Government to enact laws within Consti-
tutional limits to protect the order, safety, health, morals, and general
welfare of society."8 In a Federal system such as ours, inherent powers
reside in the States, which have granted to the Federal Government
only such powers as are expressly conferred by the Constitution.
A state government may vest a locality or other subdivision with
the police power only by means of delegation.9 Once delegated, how-
ever, the range of authority possessed by the local jurisdiction pursu-
ant to the police power may be quite broad. The police power has
been held to permit a city or town to compel owners or occupants of
private houses or multiple dwellings to provide windows and ventila-
tion,1o screens, 1 maintenance of hot water, 2 and even equal access
to tenants of all races,' 3 in spite of the cost of repair, alteration or ren-
ovation, and the interference with the enjoyment of private property
imposed by such statutes and ordinances.?' This is not to imply that
municipalities are allowed complete liberty in these matters. Any
community which desires to enforce certain standards of conduct must
state them with specificity. Vague or indefinite requirements are open
to attack on the ground that the locality has received an unlawful
grant of legislative authority from the State.s Until June, 1967, how-
ever, the Supreme Court appeared to find favor with housing codes
governing a wide range of behavior, including the obligation to admit
housing inspectors.
8. Lees v. Bay Area Pollution Control Dist. 238 Cal. App. 2d 930, 48 Cal.
Rptr. 295, 299 (1965).
9. Mansfield & Swett, Inc. v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 151, 198
A. 225, 229 (1938).
10. Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955); State
v. Schaffel, 4 Conn. Cir. 234, 229 A.2d 552 (1966).
11. Paquette v. City of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155 N.E.2d 775 (1959).
12. Danker v. City of New York, 20 Misc. 2d 557, 194 N.Y.S. 975 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
13. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 344 Mass. 387,
397, 182 N.E.2d 595, 602 (1962).
14. Apple v. City and County of Denver, 154 Col. 166, 390 P.2d 91 (1964);
see generally NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HousINO AND REDEVELOPMENT OF-
FICIALS, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HOUSING CODES (2d ed. 1964).
15. Cf. Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955).
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Inspection of a citizen's premises impinges upon his right to remain
free from intrusions by local officials and interferes with the right to
privacy, which has long been respected in this country. In the year
1765, an English court set the stage for what was to follow when it
decided the celebrated case of Entick v. Carrington.16 An action in
trespass was brought against a government official who had searched
the plaintiff's premises and seized some private papers. In language
which has since often been quoted the court held that:
... every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a
trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my
license but he is liable to an action, though the damage be noth-
ing .... 17
This desire to prohibit incursions into private property prompted
the debate which led to the ratification of the Fourth Amendment to
the Constitution. In urging that the Amendment be adopted, Patrick
Henry of Virginia stated that otherwise:
. excisemen . .. may... go into your cellars and rooms, and
search, ransack and measure everything you eat, drink and wear.-8
The Fourth Amendment was subsequently added to the Constitution,
and warned those who would conduct searches and seizures that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized. 19
Right of entry disputes have always turned upon the question of
what constitutes an "unreasonable" search within the meaning of the
Constitution. But it was not until 1959 that the Supreme Court, in a
5-4 decision, held that a housing code inspection, although conducted
without a warrant, did not violate the proscriptions mentioned, when
the evidence obtained was not intended for use in a criminal prosecu-
tion. This was the holding in the case of Frank v. Maryland,20 in
16. 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
17. Brief for Appellant at 12, Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967).
18. Id. at 13.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
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which a construction which was to last for eight years was placed upon
the Fourth Amendment.
Frank's neighbor had complained of rats, and a housing inspector
was detailed to investigate the complaint. A large pile of debris and
rodent feces was discovered at the rear of the lot. On the basis of this
evidence, the inspector sought entry under a Baltimore ordinance
which contained a section imposing a fine upon anyone refusing him.
He was not permitted to enter the dwelling, although he asked to do
so on two occasions. The appellant was tried and convicted, pursuant
to the applicable section of the Baltimore Housing Code.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the majority, stated that there are two
separate protections afforded the householder through the Constitu-
tion's limitations upon official invasion. First, there is the right to
privacy, the right to shut one's door against officials of the State, unless
their attempt at entry is under proper authority of law. This right is
subject to certain conditions. Secondly, the individual has a right to
resist unauthorized entry designed to secure evidence which may be
used to deprive him of life, liberty or property in a criminal proceed-
ing. This is the more important type of protection offered.21 The
Court held that there is no absolute right to refuse consent to an in-
spection designed solely for the protection of the community's health,
and that, assessing the right to privacy with due respect for the impor-
tance of the free exercise of the police power, the right to privacy
must be qualified. Therefore, it was stated, only those searches for
evidence to be used in a criminal prosecution which can deprive one
of life, liberty or property can be Constitutionally resisted when made
without a warrant.
This line of reasoning, which interpreted the Fourth Amendment's
protections in light of the Fifth Amendment's provision that no per-
son shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, provided the original basis for the sections of the APHA-PHS
Code dealing with inspection.22 These sections read:
11.01 The (Appropriate Authority) is hereby authorized and
directed to make inspections pursuant to one or more of the
plans for inspection authorized by Section 10.01; or in response
to a complaint that an alleged violation of the provisions of this
ordinance or of applicable rules or regulations pursuant thereto
has been committed; or when the (Appropriate Authority) has
21. 359 U.S. 360, 365; see Note, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1119 (1967).
22. APHA-PHS CODE §§ X, XI.
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valid reason to believe that a violation of this ordinance or any
rules and regulations pursuant thereto has been committed.
11.02 The (Appropriate Authority) is hereby authorized to en-
ter and inspect between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
all dwellings, dwelling units, and rooming houses, rooming units,
and dormitory rooms subject to the provisions of this ordinance
for the purpose of determining whether there is compliance with
its provisions.
11.03 The (Appropriate Authority) is hereby authorized to in-
spect the premises surrounding dwellings, dwelling units, room-
ing units, and dormitory rooms subject to this ordinance, for the
purpose of determining whether there is compliance with its
provisions.
11.07 If any owner, occupant, or other person in charge of a
dwelling, dwelling unit or rooming unit, or a multiple dwelling
or rooming house subject to the provisions of Section XII re-
fuses, impedes, inhibits, interferes with, restricts or obstructs
entry or free access to every part of the structure or premises
where inspection authorized by this ordinance is sought, the
(Appropriate Authority) may seek in a court of competent juris-
diction an order that such owner, occupant or other person in
charge cease and desist with [sic] such interference.
Although these sections were somewhat inartistically drafted, their
constitutionality appeared free of doubt, so long as the Frank rule
obtained. One year after that decision, the Supreme Court reviewed
its position in Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price.23 In this case, a householder
in Dayton refused entry to a health inspector, in violation of a local
ordinance. Eight Justices of the Court took part in the decision, and,
because they divided equally, the decision of the Supreme Court of
Ohio affirming the penalty was allowed to stand.
The four dissenters pointed out that unlike the Frank case, in
which the inspection had also been conducted without the home-
owner's consent or a warrant, there was present in this situation no
physical indication of a probable violation of the City's housing code,
and the inspector's actions therefore appeared harder to justify. But
the rule in the Frank case remained in force until June 5, 1967, and
provided the legal foundation for the imposition of fines and penal-
ties against those who impeded the free access of local officials in rou-
tine inspections.24
23. 364 U.S. 263 (1960).
24. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hadley, 351 Mass. 439, 222 N.E.2d 681 (1966),
vacated, 388 U.S. 464 (1967).
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With the overturning of Frank, the concept of employing penalties
to coerce an unwilling householder to admit the housing inspector
who does not possess a warrant, has met its end, and the sections of
the proposed ordinance just described must be stricken from the rec-
ommended legislation. But in the recent decisions which have de-
clared that it is unconstitutional to penalize a householder for resisting
the warrantless inspection of his dwelling,21 or to invoke criminal
procedure against a businessman who refuses to allow firemen to sur-
vey the interior of his locked warehouseM6 the Supreme Court has
indicated that it is still possible to pursue area-wide inspections pur-
suant to a housing code.
The landmark decision, in which the scope of the Fourth Amend-
ment was declared to extend far beyond the situation in which evi-
dence for use in a criminal prosecution is sought, came in the case of
Camara v. Municipal Court.97 Roland Camara occupied the premises
at the rear of an apartment building in San Francisco which was in-
spected pursuant to a local ordinance covering the licensing of such
multiple dwellings. The inspector was admitted by a building mana-
ger, who informed him of this residential use of the ground floor,
which use allegedly violated the terms of the occupancy permit as-
signed to the building. Camara freely admitted that he occupied an
apartment behind the store which he leased in the building, but re-
fused to allow the inspector to enter his rooms without a warrant. The
inspector returned to seek entry on two further occasions, but never
did equip himself with a warrant, and Camara, therefore, would not
permit the inspection of his apartment. He was cited for violating a
section of San Francisco's housing code which imposed a fine of up to
$500 or imprisonment for six months, or both, for each refusal to give
an inspector free access, and his subsequent conviction was upheld by
the Supreme Court of California.
Camara's principal contention on appeal was that the interpreta-
tion given the Fourth Amendment in the Frank case was erroneous,
and should be overruled. The history of the Amendment, it was ar-
gued, amply demonstrates that the drafters of the Bill of Rights were
concerned with the protection of private citizens against unreasonable
invasions by the government and did not consider the purpose of the
Amendment, later carried into operation in the States by the pro-
25. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
26. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
27. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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visions of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, to be
the mere protection against illegal searches for evidence to be em-
ployed in criminal cases.2 a
Speaking for a majority of the Court, Mr. Justice White reasoned
that:
The basic purpose of this Amendment... is to safeguard the pri-
vacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasion by gov-
ernmental officials.29
He went on to state that it would be anomalous to say that the indi-
vidual and his property are to be given constitutional protection
against intrusions only when the person whose rights are invaded is
suspected of criminal activity. The Camara case expressly overruled
Frank and held that the citizen may lawfully refuse to admit the
housing inspector in a non-emergency situation, when the inspector
is not possessed of a warrant, or cannot demonstrate probable cause
to believe that the local housing code is being violated.
But the Court did not stop at this point. Camara had argued that
any valid warrant obtained in connection with a housing inspection
must particularly set forth probable cause to believe a given dwelling
is in a condition violative of the local housing ordinance, just as a
warrant sworn out in a criminal case must specifically describe the
premises to be searched and the persons or property to be seized. Since
the whole purpose of area-wide inspection is to determine the state
of existing housing, it would be impossible for any agency desiring
to conduct such a program to state in advance exactly what is hoped
to discover.
Accordingly, the Court refused to accept this portion of appellant's
argument. Rather, it developed the concept of "area" probable cause,
for warrants designed to facilitate housing inspection. This means
that where reasonable legislative or administrative standards appli-
cable to area-wide inspections exist, the locality must permit a magis4
trate to review its application for a warrant, but should receive such a
warrant if these minimum standards properly may be applied to the
structure to which entry is sought. These requirements, happily, are
in keeping with the directives given by the Model Ordinance in its
Section 10:
28. Brief for Appellant at 12-14.
29. 387 U.S. at 533.
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10.01 The (Appropriate Agency) is hereby authorized and di-
rected to develop and adopt plans for the inspection of dwelling
units subject to the provisions of this ordinance, including:
(a) A plan for the periodic inspection of multiple dwell-
ings and rooming houses subject to the provisions of Sec-
tion X1I, governing the licensing of the operation of such
dwellings;
(b) A plan for the systematic inspection of dwelling units
contained in such contiguous areas within this (Name of
Corporate Unit) as may from time to time be designated
by the (Appropriate Agency).
In the companion case to Camara, See v. City of Seattle,30 a penalty
was provided for interfering with the inspectors who wished to enter
defendant's locked warehouse without a warrant. The Camara doc-
trine was extended to commercial premises, as the Court stated:
... we see no justification for... relaxing Fourth Amendment
safeguards where the official inspection is intended to aid enforce-
ment of laws prescribing minimum physical standards for com-
mercial premisesP'
It should be understood that the obtaining of these civil warrants,
which represents an entirely new procedure in most jurisdictions, will
be dependent upon the law of each state and should not be dealt with
specifically in a local ordinance. Few states have as yet acted to imple.
ment a procedure for the issuance of these warrants.3 2
The Court did not require that these warrants issue in every case,-3
but only where the householder refuses to consent to the inspection of
his premises. While the number of those who object to warrantless
searches may exceed what Mr. Justice Douglas once referred to as "one
rebel a year", 34 proper education of the community in the general im-
portance of housing inspections should form a part of the responsibil-
ity of any agency charged with the administration of a housing code,
30. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
31. Id. at 543.
32. See Address by Edelman, Search Warrants and Sanitation Inspections-
The New Look in Enforcement (Presented at the 95th Annual Meeting of the
American Public Health Association, Inc., Miami, Florida, October 25, 1967).
33. "We therefore conclude that administrative entry, without consent, . . .
may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework
of a warrant procedure." See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 545.
34. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 384 (1959) (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Douglas).
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and should assist in minimizing difficulties. Section 17 of the proposed
ordinance therefore provides:
17.01 The (Appropriate Authority) is hereby authorized to col-
lect and disseminate information concerning techniques of main-
tenance, repair, and sanitation in housing and concerning the
requirements of this ordinance and applicable rules and regula-
tions issued pursuant thereto.
Coupled with good public relations, education of the public can do
much to facilitate what has become the "privilege" of entry for hous-
ing inspectors.
II. THE GATHERING AND UsE oF EVIDENCE
Closely related to the problem of effecting legal entry of a structure
is the question of what use may be made of any evidence obtained in
the course of an inspection. Before the Frank decision, the Supreme
Court had ruled that evidence obtained in a search and seizure con-
ducted in a manner violative of the Fourth Amendment's require-
ments must be excluded from criminal prosecutions in the federal
courts. In Mapp v. Ohio,35 decided two years after Frank, this "ex-
clusionary rule" was held applicable to the states, through the opera-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which car-
ries over to the states those portions of the Bill of Rights deemed
essential to the preservation of liberty. The Court in Frank had spoken
only of the actual right of entry and had made no mention of the
use to be made of any evidence obtained. The Mapp decision now
made it dear that quite apart from the right of entry question, evi-
dence obtained without a warrant or probable cause to believe a
statute or ordinance had been violated could not be employed to pros-
ecute the alleged wrongdoer.
Several years later, the Mapp doctrine was applied to invalidate a
criminal prosecution for doing business in a non-business zone, a viola-
tion of a New York village ordinance.36 The village had authorized
the building inspector to enter any building or premises at reasonable
hours for the purpose of enforcing the local business zoning ordinance.
On three occasions the building inspector entered the premises owned
by one Laverne, and made certain observations. These observations
became the basis for three separate criminal convictions for conducting
35. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
36. People v. Laverne, 14 N.Y.2d 304, 200 N.E.2d 441, 251 N.Y.S.2d 452(1964).
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business in a non-business zone, contrary to law. The Court of Ap-
peals of New York reversed these convictions, stating:
But we do not have before us summary administrative action or
civil proceedings to preserve health or public safety, but rather
official searches of private premises without a warrant which have
become the basis of criminal prosecutions and convictions.31
Warrants, then, would appear necessary both when the right of entry
is disputed and when evidence intended for use in a criminal prose-
cution is to be seized without the householder's consent.
Penalties for violation form an integral part of any housing code.
But if constitutional restrictions apply to the use of evidence in crimi-
nal prosecutions, there might be a significant advantage in creating
purely civil penalties for the offender against housing codes. Civil
penalties do not carry with them the stigma of a police record, and
avoid the difficulty encountered when a criminal court is reluctant
to impose a very stiff fine upon one whose only transgression is a viola-
tion of a local housing ordinance. 3 The civil penalty is contemplated
by the APHA-PHS Code, which in Section 15 reads:
15.01 Any owner, occupant or other person in charge of a dwell.
ing, dwelling unit or rooming unit who has received the second
order or notice of a violation of this ordinance may be subject
to a civil penalty of - dollars per day for each day the
violation continues after expiration of the specified ... period,
or to - days in jail, or to both, provided that no such pen.
alty shall be applicable while a reconsideration, hearing or ap.
peal to a court of competent jurisdiction is pending in the mat-
ter.
Whatever the other benefits to be derived from this kind of civil
penalty, it is not immune from the operation of the exclusionary rule,
as was once believed. As they have done in the area of right of entry,
courts have divorced the protection of the Fourth Amendment-the
protection of privacy, from that conferred by the Fifth Amendment-
the protection against self-incrimination.
This process had its beginnings in the case captioned One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania.39 In this proceeding, state liquor
enforcement officers, without either search warrants or probable cause
37. Id. at 305, 200 N.E.2d at 442, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 453.
38. Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement, Sanctions and Remedies,
66 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1254 (1966).
39. 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
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to believe that any state law had been violated, stopped and searched
appellant's automobile, and found thirty-six cases of liquor therein.
The State filed a petition for forfeiture of the car, a civil proceeding.
The Pennsylvania State Supreme Court upheld the action, stating
that the exclusionary rule applies in criminal cases only. But the
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that evidence obtained
in a search made in violation of the Fourth Amendment may not be
relied upon by a state to sustain a forfeiture, under the prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to Due Process of Law. A for-
feiture under these circumstances could lead to even greater penalties
than an impermissible criminal prosecution. Such an anomalous situ-
ation, said the Court, must not be permitted to occur.
Tribunals in several states have extended the rule somewhat fur-
ther. The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed a civil action to abate
gambling as a public nuisance.40 State officials sought to confiscate de-
fendant's gaming equipment and to close his place of business. Ap-
plying the rules of Mapp and One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, the court
reversed the judgment, stating that because the search was conducted
pursuant to improperly issued warrants, it was improper under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
In a New York case, Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow v. La-
verne Originals, Inc.,41 the same building inspector who had observed
Laverne conducting business in a non-business zone, and who had
failed in his efforts to prosecute the alleged violator, sought a court
order to enjoin the further commission of the offense. The New York
Court of Appeals applied the exclusionary rule of Mapp, and the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, stating that civil fines are basi-
cally penal sanctions, especially when imprisonment is an alternative
to the imposition of the fine, as was true in this case. A lower court
judgment that defendant could properly be found in contempt was
overturned.
The exclusionary rule has recently been applied to civil proceed-
ings even where the threat of any sort of penal sanction or depriva-
tion of property is totally absent. In Williams v. Williams/42 a divorce
case, an Ohio court denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The
motion was based upon the allegation that plaintiff was in possession
of new evidence-evidence which he had obtained by breaking into
40. Carson v. State, 221 Ga. 299, 144 S.E.2d 384 (1965).
41. 17 N.Y.2d 900, 218 N.E.2d 703, 271 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1966).
42. 8 Ohio Misc. 156, 221 N.E.2d 622 (Ct. of Common Pleas 1966).
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his former wife's automobile. In language prophetic of what was to
be decided in the Camara case, the court held that the history of the
Fourth Amendment indicates that it was never meant to be relegated
to the mere protection of those accused of crime. Through the opera-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment precludes
the use of evidence obtained in this manner, and the Mapp rule must
be broadened. Similarly, in the New Jersey case of Del Presto v. Del
Presto,4 3 evidence obtained in the forcible entry of a correspondent's
home by private detectives was denied admission in a divorce pro-
ceeding.
It has become dear that while both area inspection and the use of
evidence to impose civil penalties upon those who would violate the
Model Ordinance have been given the sanction of the courts and
authorities writing in the field, great care must be taken in entering
structures and in gathering evidence to see that the requirements of
the Constitution have been met. Wherever possible, consent to in-
spection activities should be obtained from the householder. Educa-
tion of the public can help in inducing such consent, as can the as-
surances which appear in section 11.06 of the Ordinance:
11.06 The (Appropriate Authority) shall keep confidential all
evidence not related to the purposes of this ordinance and any
rules and regulations pursuant thereto, which he may discover
in the course of inspection. Such evidence shall be considered
privileged, and shall not be admissable in any judicial proceed-
ing, without the consent of the owner, occupant, or other per-
son in charge of the dwelling unit or rooming unit so inspected.
III. THE LICENSING OF MULTIPLE DWELLINGS
Section 12 of the Ordinance establishes a licensing procedure for
all multiple dwellings. This sort of licensing, when reasonably related
to minimum standards of sanitation, has for some time been recog-
nized as a proper exercise of the police power, even when the adop-
tion of the plan has had a retroactive effect. 4- The first two portions
of this part of the Ordinance represent nothing which differs radically
from any comparable ordinances. They simply provide that no per-
son may operate a multiple dwelling or rooming house unless he holds
an unrevoked and current operating license to do so. These licenses
may be renewed for successive periods of one year each, and in sec-
43. 92 N.J. Super. 305, 223 A.2d 217 (1966).
44. Savage v. Dist. of Columbia, 69 N.J.L. 11, 54 A.2d 562 (1947), Gil-
man v. City of Newark, 73 N.J. Super. 562, 180 A.2d 365 (1962).
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tion 12.04, the filing of appropriate application and renewal forms,
developed by the enforcing agency are declared to be necessary before
an application can be honored. Section 12.06 provides for the pay-
ment of licensing fees, charges designed to provide part of the revenue
with which the locality will undertake rehabilitation.
Section 12.03 calls for inspection of an applicant's premises prior to
the issuance of any operating license, in these terms:
12.03 The (Appropriate Authority) is hereby authorized, upon
application therefor to issue new operating licenses, and renew-
als thereof, in the names of applicant owners of multiple dwell-
ings and rooming houses. No such licenses shall be issued
unless the multiple dwelling or rooming house in connection
with which the license is sought is found after inspection to meet
the requirements of this ordinance and of applicable rules and
regulations pursuant thereto.
This prior inspection as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license
to do business has not as yet been drawn into question by the Supreme
Court, which in the See case gave an indication that it was in agree-
ment with the regulation of businesses in the interest of the commu-
nity.45 This raises the rather intriguing question of whether licenses
might not be made to expire fairly often, necessitating the granting of
a "new" license after a new inspection procedure has been completed.
But if initial inspection prior to the licensing of a multiple dwelling
or rooming house appears not to give rise to serious questions as yet,
the prior consent to periodic inspections made without warrants dur-
ing the pendency of the license may well be vitiated by the teachings
of the See case. There is also the exclusionary rule to be considered,
as will be demonstrated shortly. Section 12.05 of the Ordinance re-
quires prior consent to periodic inspections, stating:
12.05 No operating license shall be issued or renewed unless
the applicant owner agrees in his application to such inspections
pursuant to sections 10.01 and 11.01 as the (Appropriate Au-
thority) may require to determine whether the multiple dwell-
ing or rooming house in connection with which such license is
sought is in compliance with the provisions of this ordinance
and with applicable rules and regulations pursuant thereto.
Whether this kind of enforced consent alone will be allowed to per-
mit periodic entry of a licensed multiple dwelling or rooming house
is not predictable, but that is only the beginning of the difficulty. The
45. 387 U.S. at 544.
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procedure envisioned does not seem quite so secure after two rulings
relating to administrative proceedings in connection with liquor li-
censes. In New York, an intermediate court of appeals applied the
exclusionary rule to an administrative proceeding to divest a saloon
keeper, who permitted gambling on his premises, of his license to do
business.46 The evidence employed was gathered by inspectors whose
warrants were vacated as being issued without probable cause in a
criminal prosecution based upon the same facts. The court reversed
the agency decision against the owner, stating that the exclusionary
rule applies to all evidence obtained in an illegal search, whether de-
signed for use in criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or even summary
agency proceedings.
The case just described was reversed by the New York Court of
Appeals on grounds not relevant to the present discussion,47 but a
similar line of reasoning was applied recently in Pennsylvania to in-
validate a $250 fine imposed for the violation of the terms of a liquor
license.48 In this proceeding, the evidence was obtained without a valid
search warrant, and deprived defendant of what the court described
as the property right he had in his license, without the requisite due
process of law.
Particular importance might be attached to the exclusionary rule
because of an innovation which the Model Code contemplates. In
order to discover and remedy violations of the terms of operating li-
censes more easily, the inspector is to have access to a sort of business
record, charting the complaints of tenants and the response made to
them. It is provided:
12.11 Every owner or other person in charge of a licensed
multiple dwelling or rooming house shall keep, or cause to be
kept, records of all requests for repair and complaints by ten-
ants, which are related to the provisions of this ordinance and to
any applicable rules and regulations, and of all corrections
made in response to such requests and complaints. Such records
shall be made available by the owner or other person in charge
to the (Appropriate Authority) for inspection and copying upon
demand. Such records shall be admissable in any administrative
or judicial proceeding pursuant to the provisions of this ordi-
46. Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, 25 App. Div. 2d 225, 268 N.Y.S.2d
433.
47. 19 N.Y.2d 418, 227 N.E.2d 302, 280 N.Y.S.2d 381(1967).
48. Pennsylvania State Liquor Control Bd. v. Leonardzak, 210 Pa. Super.
511, 233 A.2d 606 (1967).
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nance as prima facie evidence of the violation or the correction
of violations of this ordinance or applicable rules and regula-
tions pursuant thereto.
There is precedent for this requirement,49 but it is possible that courts
may compel an inspector who wishes to employ these records to re-
voke a license, to have obtained his evidence with a search warrant,
if the licensed owner objects to their seizure.
Our principal emphasis in this discussion of licensing procedures,
as in those involving inspections and evidence, has been with the
spectre of unconstitutionality which has lately begun to haunt the
local health officer and is rattling some chains in close proximity to
the provisions of the Model Code. However, the proposed ordinance
contains much that is worthy of discussion without reference to the
emerging interpretations being fashioned daily by the courts. As a
tool for enforcement, the use of licensing, including periodic inspec-
tions, represents an important modification of many of the housing
codes now in force.
Another major problem with which the provisions on licensing at-
tempt to deal is that of the absentee landlord who cannot be reached
for notice of violations. Very stringent control is placed upon the li-
censed owner by sections 12.07, 12.08, and 12.09 of the Code. 12.07
deals specifically with nonresident owners:
12.07 No operating license shall be issued or renewed for a non-
resident applicant, unless such applicant designates in writing
the (Appropriate Local Official) his agent for the receipt of
service of notice of violation of the provisions of this ordinance
and for service of process pursuant to this ordinance.
This section borrows an idea from the law of most states with regard
to foreign corporations, which generally compels the company which
desires a local situs of operation to designate the secretary of state its
agent for service of process. In the present context, the owner of a
multiple dwelling or rooming house will similarly remain amenable
to such service through the use of an agent.
With regard to the resident owner, who may temporarily be outside
the jurisdiction, this ordinance requires that a substitute be named for
purposes of service in certain cases. Free choice is allowed in selecting
such an agent:
49. Cf. Sherman, Clay & Co. v. Brown, 142 Wash. 37, 252 P. 137 (1927);
3 E. MCQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 24.332 (3rd ed.
1949).
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12.08 No operating license shall be issued or renewed for a resi-
dent applicant, unless such applicant has first designated an
agent for the receipt of service of violations of the provisions of
this ordinance and for service of process pursuant to this ordi-
nance when said applicant is absent from this (Name of corpor-
ate unit) for thirty (30) or more days. Such a designation shall
be made in writing, and shall accompany each application form.
The applicant may designate any person resident in this (Name
of corporate unit) his agent for this purpose, or may designate
the (Appropriate Local Official) his agent for this purpose.
Any licensed owner must give twenty-four hours notice of the transfer
of legal control over his property and his license is not transferrable
to other properties. 0 These provisions serve to assure the enforcing
agency the greatest possible knowledge of the multiple dwellings in
the locality, their owners, and their operators.
If violations of the terms of the ordinance are found upon the in-
spection of a licensed multiple dwelling or rooming house, the owner
or agent will be served with notice of the existence of the violation and
warned that if he does not act to correct it within a stated period of
time, his license may be suspended.51 At the end of this period, the
structure is to be reinspected, and if the violation has been allowed
to persist, the license can be suspended at the discretion of the en-
forcing agency. 52 As has been pointed out, the history of the recent
interpretation of applicable constitutional provisions has given a
strong indication that the gathering of evidence upon which such sus-
pension would be premised must adhere scrupulously to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, as it has been interpreted by
the courts. Should the suspension procedure be invoked, the owner
could ask for an informal conference to reconsider the agency action,
or for a full-scale formal hearing, but if this request is not received
within twenty-one days following suspension, the license shall be re-
voked.5 3 Prior to revocation, the owner may request reinspection to
prove that the violations have been corrected. If reinspection reveals
that the situation has indeed been rectified, the license will be rein-
stated, except that the application for reinspection cannot be used to
extend the period of suspension.54 Every effort should be made to in-
50. APHA-PHS CODE § 12.10.
51. Id. at § 12.12.
52. Id. at § 12.13.
53. Id. at § 12.14.
54. Id. at § 12.15.
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fluence the owner to cooperate with the locality and to retain control
of his business. As the ordinance makes dear, revocation of a license
is viewed as a measure of last resort, to be invoked only after the
agency charged with enforcement has decided that suspension is neces-
sary and that no action has been taken to correct the conditions which
have produced the determination, or to dispute its fairness. This
two-step process should help in persuading erring landlords to return
to the fold without causing the closing of many multiple dwellings.
In extreme cases, the municipality may have to purchase and assume
the obligation of repairing, or otherwise correcting, the failings of the
structure, thereafter selling and licensing their operation to more-law-
abiding landlords. Such a procedure will depend upon financial re-
sources, and will not entirely prevent what has remained a problem
for administration: what to do with the unfortunate tenants of a land-
lord who prefers to allow his license to be revoked.
IV. ADMINISTRATIvE PROCIEDUR
In an age which has witnessed a communications revolution as pro-
found as the twentieth century's, it seems odd that the failure to re-
ceive timely and adequate notice of violations is so often raised as a
defense by those who are charged with refusal or unwillingness to meet
the minimum standards of a local housing code. The proposed ordi-
nance's requirements for notice have been drawn with a view toward
providing the locality with great flexibility, so as to respond to each
jurisdiction's capabilities and financial posture. At the same time, it
makes a real attempt to assure that adequate notice will be given of
all violations, in order to provide the owner or occupant with full due
process of law. Multiple notices will reach the perpetrator of a con-
tinuing violation in the hope of eliciting his cooperation in setting
matters right. Section 14 of the Ordinance, which encompasses the
methods for serving an alleged wrongdoer with notice, provides an
administrative framework for the enforcement procedures contained
in this model legislation:
14.01 Whenever the (Appropriate Authority) determines that
any dwelling, dwelling unit, or rooming unit, or the premises
surrounding any of these, fails to meet the requirements set
forth in this ordinance or in applicable rules and regulations is-
sued pursuant thereto, he shall issue a notice setting forth the al-
leged failures, and advising the owner, occupant or other per-
son in charge that such failures must be corrected. This notice
shall:
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14.01.01 Be in writing
14.01.02 Set forth the alleged violations of this ordinance
or of applicable rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
14.01.03 Describe the dwelling, dwelling unit or rooming
unit where the violations are alleged to exist or to have
been committed.
14.01.04 Provide a reasonable time, not to exceed sixty
(60) days, for the correction of any violation alleged.
14.01.05 Be served upon the owner, occupant or other per-
son in charge of the dwelling, dwelling unit, or rooming unit
personally, or by registered mail, return receipt requested,
addressed to the last known place of residence of the owner,
occupant or other person in charge. If one or more per-
sons to whom such notice is addressed cannot be found
after diligent effort to do so, service may be made upon
such person or persons by posting a notice in or about the
dwelling, dwelling unit or rooming unit described in the
notice, or by causing such notice to be published in a news-
paper of general circulation for a period of - consec-
utive days; or
14.01.06 Be served upon a resident agent for the receipt
of such service of notice designated pursuant to Section
12.08; or
14.01.07 Be served upon the (Appropriate Local Official)
where he has been designated agent for such service pursu-
ant to Section 12.07.
Notice, therefore, can be given a violator personally, by mail, by
posting a placard, or by publication. Further sections of the Ordi-
nance call for reinspection at the end of the stated period of time
allowed for correction, 55 and for the filing of an order requiring the
correction of all violations within a period of not more than sixty
additional days, provided the alleged violator does not request an in-
formal reconsideration or petition for a formal hearing.56
The violator who persists in his failure to meet the minimum stan-
dards provided in the Code is, of course, subject to penalties. But he
is also subject to a cloud on his title by virtue of a system for the re-
cording of second notices of violation:
14.05 The (Appropriate Authority), after the expiration of
the time granted the persons served with such second notice to
55. Id. at § 14.02.
56. Id. at § 14.03.
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seek reconsideration or a hearing in the manner hereinafter
provided by this ordinance, or after a final decision adverse to
such person served has been rendered by the (Hearing Agency)
or by (a court of competent jurisdiction) to which an appeal
has been taken, shall cause the second notice to be recorded in
the (registry of deeds).
14.06 All subsequent transferees of the dwelling, dwelling unit
or rooming unit in connection with which a second notice has
been so recorded shall be deemed to have notice of the contin-
uing existence of the violations alleged, and shall be liable to
all penalties and procedures provided by this ordinance and by
applicable rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto to the
same degree as was their transferor.
Violations have been made to run with the property, so that a re-
corded second notice carries with it all the effect of an unsatisfied lien.
This procedure adds the sanction of the marketplace to the traditional
penal sanction in the attempt to produce compliance with the terms
of the Ordinance. Because of its similarity to the prior lien situation,
this sort of cloud upon title does not appear unduly restrictive of the
free alienation of property, but the provision may have to be tested
in the courts before stating with certainty that it does not illegally
restrict the sale or exchange of property. Even so, the concept is one
which should receive serious consideration in the preparation of hous-
ing codes for modern municipalities.
The person charged with a failure to comply with the provisions of
a housing code must be given an opportunity to present his case. It
is also necessary, however, that each jurisdiction rigorously enforce
'the provisions of its ordinance. To assure that fairness will be shown
the alleged violator, within the capabilities of each jurisdiction to
grant him his day before the agency, the Model Code has been drafted
to include two separate procedures and is written in the alternative.
The first method for considering the case presented by the house-
holder is rather informal, and is primarily designed for use in smaller
localities, or in those lacking the resources of money or manpower
necessary to implement the more formal procedures contained in the
second alternative. Alternative A, the application for reconsideration,
is presented in the first portion of Section 18 of the Code:
18.01.01 Any person aggrieved by a notice of the (Appropriate
Authority) issued in connection with any alleged violation of
this ordinance or of applicable rules and regulations issued pur-
suant thereto, or by any order requiring repair or demolition
pursuant to Sections 16.01 or 16.02, may apply to the (Appro.
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priate Authority) for a reconsideration of such notice or order
within twenty-one (21) days after it has been issued.
18.01.02 The (Appropriate Authority) shall set a time and place
for an informal conference on the matter within ten (10) days
of the receipt of such application, and shall advise the applicant
of such time and place in writing.
18.01.03 At the informal conference, the applicant shall be per-
mitted to present his grounds for believing that the order should
be revoked or modified to one or more representatives of the
(Appropriate Authority).
18.01.04 Within ten (10) days following the close of the informal
conference the (Appropriate Authority) shall advise the appli-
cant whether or not it will modify or set aside the notice order
issued by the (Appropriate Authority).
The purposes of the informal conference are persuasion and con-
ciliation, to be achieved in a manner more akin to serious discussion
than to formal adjudication. There is no separate administrative
tribunal asking for the presentation of evidence. This process is an
attempt to work things out in a personal way. Properly utilized, it can
serve to educate a community and to earn a considerable degree of
public good will.
If a person believing himself aggrieved by a notice or order, deter-
mines that he wishes an independent review of his case, and the one
against him, he may by-pass the conference procedure and file, instead,
for a hearing before a tribunal constituted for no other purpose. This
course of action would also be available to those dissatisfied with the
decision of the enforcing agency following an informal conference.
It is described in Alternative A, Section 18.02 of the Ordinance:
18.02.01 Any person aggrieved by a notice of the (Appropri-
ate Authority) issued in connection with any alleged violation
of the provisions of this ordinance or of any applicable rules and
regulations pursuant thereto, or by order requiring repair
or demolition pursuant to Sections 16.01 and 16.02, may file
with the (Hearing Agency) a petition setting forth his reasons
for contesting the notice or order.
The petition, which must be filed within twenty-one days after the
service of the notice or order complained of by the person aggrieved 7
initiates a completely de novo review of the matter. The agency which
receives the petition possesses the discretion to hear the case or not. s
57. Id. at § 18.02.02 (Alternative A).
58. Id. at § 18.02.03 (Alternative A).
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A refusal to hear the case would seem sufficient to permit a court to
review the proceeding. A petitioner will be notified in writing of the
agency's decision.
If a hearing is granted, notice is given the petitioner in the follow-
ing manner and the Hearing Agency will dispose of the case in ac-
cordance with the powers given it by Section 18.02:
18.02.04 When the (Hearing Agency) determines to hold a
a hearing, it shall serve petitioner with notice of its decision
in the manner provided for service of notice in Section 14. Such
notice shall be served within ten (10) days of the receipt of the
petition.
18.02.05 At the hearing, the petitioner shall be given an oppor-
tunity to show cause why the notice or order should be modified
or withdrawn, or why the period of time permitted for compli-
ance should be extended.
18.02.06 The (Hearing Agency) shall have the power to affirm,
modify, or revoke the notice or order, and may grant an exten-
sion of time for the performance of any act required of not
more than - additional month(s), where the (Hearing
Agency) finds that there is practical difficulty or undue hard-
ship connected with the performance of any act required by the
provisions of this ordinance or by applicable rules or regulations
issued pursuant thereto, and that such extension is in harmony
with the general purpose of this ordinance to secure the public
health, safety and welfare.
18.02.07 The (Hearing Agency) may grant variances from the
provisions of this ordinance or from applicable rules and regu-
lations issued pursuant thereto, when the (Hearing Agency)
finds that there is practical difficulty or undue hardship con-
nected with the performance of any act required by this ordi-
nance and applicable rules and regulations pursuant thereto;
that strict adherence to such provisions would be arbitrary in
the case at hand; that extension would not provide an appropri-
ate remedy in the case at hand, and that such variance is in har-
mony with the general purpose of this ordinance to secure the
public health, safety and welfare.
Barring an accommodation reached at a preliminary conference,
this hearing is the first opportunity for the individual to obtain relief
for his grievances if they have been well taken. In addition to posses-
sing the power to overturn an unjust notice or order, the agency cho-
sen to preside at hearings can act to grant a period of time for com-
pliance greater than that originally stipulated, can modify an order
in any material respect, or can create special exceptions to the mini-
mum standards set forth in the ordinance.
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The hearing procedure proposed by the second alternative set of
provisions is somewhat different from that just detailed, since it con.
stitutes a review of an earlier proceeding and is based upon a record
of this earlier administrative adjudication. This first step is a formal
conference, presided over by a referee, who would be specially quali-
fied for his role. It is designed primarily for jurisdictions with larger
populations and greater resources:
18.01.01 Any person aggrieved by a notice of the (Appropriate
Authority) issued in connection with any alleged violation of
this ordinance or of applicable rules and regulations issued pur-
suant thereto, or by any order requiring repair or demolition
pursuant to Sections 16.01 and 16.02 may petition the (Appro.
priate Authority) for a conference on the matter. The petition
may be filed by means of a letter, setting forth the petitioner's
grounds for contesting the notice or order and must be received
by the (Appropriate Authority) within twenty-one (21) days
after such notice or order was served on the petitioner.
18.01.02 The (Appropriate Authority) shall set a time and
place for the conference and shall advise the petitioner in writ-
ing of such time and place, within ten (10) days of the receipt
of his petition.
18.01.03 The (Appropriate Authority) shall designate one or
more referees to preside at such conference.
18.01.04 The referee is hereby authorized to administer oaths
and affirmations and to subpoena any witnesses or documents,
which may be introduced before him.
18.01.05 A verbatim record of the proceedings before the ref-
eree shall be kept for each conference.
18.01.06 Within ten (10) days following the close of each con.
ference, the referee shall affirm, set aside or modify the notice
or order contested by the petitioner, and shall advise the peti-
tioner and the (Hearing Agency) of his decision in writing.
No informal discussion is envisioned here. This is an adjudication
before an administrative officer with quasi-judicial authority and the
power to reverse the agency, if necessary. Any further administrative
proceedings amount to an administrative review on the record of the
hearing before the referee. An application for this review would have
to be filed within twenty-one days following the petitioner's notifica-
tion of an adverse decision by the referee, which would be served upon
him in the manner for serving notice already described.59 In this case,
59. Id. at § 18.02.01 (Alternative B).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1969/iss1/5
HOUSING MAINTENANCE AND OCCUPANCY CODE
the agency conducting the hearing would not be permitted to deny re-
view and would notify the petitioner of the pending hearing within
ten days of the receipt of the petition.6 The enforcing agency would
at the same time be requested to send a transcript of the proceedings
before the referee to the hearing agency for its review.61 The hearing
agency, on the basis of the record, could affirm, modify, or revoke the
notice or order which formed the basis of the petitioner's complaint.
The ordinance describes this formalized review in this manner:
18.02.05 The hearing shall be on the record of the conference.
The (Hearing Agency) after consideration of the record as a
whole, may affirm, modify or revoke the notice or order, and
may grant an extension of time for the performance of any act
of not more than - additional months, where the (Hearing
Agency) finds that there is practical difficulty or undue hard-
ship connected with the performance of any act required by the
provisions of this ordinance or by applicable rules or regula-
tions issued puruant thereto, and that such extension is in har-
mony with the general purpose of this ordinance to secure the
public health, safety and welfare.
18.02.06 The (Hearing Agency) may grant variances from the
provisions of this ordinance or from applicable rules and regu-
lations issued pursuant thereto, when the (Hearing Agency)
finds that there is practical difficulty or undue hardship con-
nected with performance of any act required by this ordinance
and applicable rules and regulations pursuant thereto; that
strict adherence to such provisions would be arbitrary in the
case at hand; that extension would not provide an appropri-
ate remedy in the case at hand; and that such variance is in har-
mony with the general purpose of this ordinance to secure the
public health, safety and welfare.
All of the agency proceedings described, whether of a formal or in-
formal nature, are specifically subjected to judicial review on the rec-
ord by a court of competent jurisdiction to insure that all aggrieved
persons are given due process of law. Section 18.03 sets forth this
guarantee:
18.03 Any person aggrieved by the final decision of the (Hear-
ing Agency) may obtain judicial review by filing on a court of
competent jurisdiction within - days of the announcement
of such decision a petition praying that the decision be set aside
in whole or in part. A copy of each petition so filed shall be
60. Id. at § 18.02.02 (Alternative B.)
61. Id. at § 18.02.03 (Alternative B).
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forthwith transmitted to the (Hearing Agency) which shall file
in court a record of the proceedings upon which it based its de-
cision. Upon the filing of such record, the court shall affirm,
modify, or vacate the decision complained of in whole or in part.
The findings of the (Hearing Agency) with respect to questions
of fact shall be sustained if supported by substantial evidence
on the record, considered as a whole.
V. FINANCING
Two essential questions must be faced by every jurisdiction which
undertakes a program of housing maintenance and rehabilitation:
"What should be done?" and "How can it best be financed?" The
proposed ordinance reflects the belief of its authors that municipalities
must move quickly to effect repair, and, when necessary, demolition
of existing structures, and that these undertakings can be successfully
financed. Section 16 of the Ordinance divides these questions into
three areas: repair, demolition, and the revolving fund.
Repair by the jurisdiction is to be invoked as a measure of last re-
sort, but should be considered as of great importance in preserving
the public health, safety, and welfare. Section 16.01.01 provides:
16.01.01 Whenever an owner or other person in charge of a
dwelling, dwelling unit or rooming unit fails, neglects or refuses
to make repairs called for by a second order or notice of viola-
tion issued pursuant to Section 14.03, the (Appropriate Author-
ity) may undertake such repairs, when in its judgment a failure
to make them will endanger the public health, safety or welfare,
and the cost of such repairs will not exceed fifty per cent
(50%) of the fair market value of the structure to be repaired.
There is precedent in the law for such a procedure,2 and the Ordi-
nance assures that action will be taken immediately to ameliorate ad-
verse conditions instead of incurring the delay which the more tra-
ditional lien on the property involves.
Notice must be given of an intention to repair,63 and the Ordinance,
as drafted, provides the workmen who actually accomplish repair with
a right of entry,64 which may well be subject to challenge in light of
the Camara and See decisions. Where a householder refuses entry to
62. Cf. City of Independence v. Purdy, 46 Iowa 202 (1877), in which the
city filled in petitioner's stagnant pond, and was permitted to recover its costs in a
civil action.
63. APHA-PHS CoDE, § 16.01.02.
64. Id. at § 16.01.03.
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a repairman, the indications point to the necessity of obtaining a war-
rant.
Rather than invoking a cumbersome process of placing a lien on the
a~ffected property, the Ordinance achieves financing for the needed
repairs from the recalcitrant owner, himself, by means of a simple civil
action for recovery of a debt. Section 16.01.04 states:
16.01.04 When repairs are made at the direction of the (Ap-
propriate Authority) the cost of such repairs shall constitute a
debt in favor of this [Jurisdiction] against the owner of the
repaired structure. In the event such owner fails, neglects or
refuses to pay this [Jurisdiction] the amount of this debt, it
shall be recoverable in a civil action, against the owner or his
successor, brought in a court of competent jurisdiction by this
[Jurisdiction] which shall possess all rights of a private creditor.
Some structures cannot economically be repaired or are so delapi-
dated as to require destruction. The Ordinance therefore provides
for demolition to be accomplished by the municipality if the owner
neglects or refuses to accomplish it within a stated period of time.
Lecovery of the costs of the undertaking would be made in the same
manner as has been provided for the recovery of sums expended for
repair:6 5
16.02.01 Any dwelling, dwelling unit or rooming unit shall be
declared unfit for human habitation when, in the judgment of
the (Appropriate Authority) it is so damaged, decayed, delapi-
dated, insanitary [sic), unsafe or vermin-infested as to create a
hazard to the health, safety and welfare of the occupants or of
the public, and where the structure is determined by the (Ap-
propriate Authority) not to warrant repair under Section
16.01.01.
Demolition is intended to extend beyond the removal of occupied
unfit structures, also applying to vacant structures:
16.02.02 Any vacant building shall be declared unfit for human
habitation, when its existence, in the judgment of the (Appro-
priate Authority), is detrimental to the publc healh, safety or
welfare.
In these cases, it may be necessary to act quickly to remove the struc-
ture so that the owner of the building determined to require demo-
lition, once served with notice, would be given ninety days to remove
65. Id. at § 16.02.06.
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the structure, 8 although he could effect a delay by seeking an informal
conference or formal hearing in the matter. 7
As in situations calling for repair, the municipality itself may under-
take demolition where the circumstances warrant:
16.02.06 When the owner fails, neglects or refuses to remove
the unfit structure within the requisite time, the (Appropriate
Authority) may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for a
demolition order. The court may grant such order when no re-
consideration or hearing on the matter is pending. The cost of
such demolition shall create a debt in favor of this (Jurisdic-
tion) against such owner, and shall be recoverable in a civil
action brought by this (Jurisdiction), which shall possess all
the rights of a private creditor.
As a safety precaution, the ordinance demands the "topping off"
of any demolition site:
16.02.07 All demolition, whether carried out by the owner or
by the (Appropriate Authority) shall include the filling in of the
excavation remaining on the property on which the demolished
structure was located, in such manner as to eliminate all po.
tential danger to the public health, safety or welfare arising
from such excavation.
Repair, demolition, and all other functions relating to the mainte-
nance or rehabilitation of housing would be supported through a re-
volving fund maintained by each jurisdiction. This fund would con-
tain all civil penalties collected, all fees collected in connection with
the licensing of multiple dwellings and rooming houses, all judgments
collected in civil actions founded on repair or demolition, any other
available local funds, and grants from any public or private sources,
the local enforcing agency having been authorized to apply for such
grants on behalf of its parent jurisdiction.As
CONCLUSION
As is true of almost all human institutions, the law must remain re-
sponsive to changing social conditions and to the advancing state of
man's ability to control his environment. New approaches must be
applied to old problems, and where they are found wanting, methods
66. Id. at § 16.02.03. Note that a building, scheduled for demolition
and vacated, may not be reoccupied under the terms of § 16.02.04.
67. Id. at § 16.02.05.
68. Id. at §§ 16.03.01(a)-(e).
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must be reshaped and tried once more. The administrative and en-
forcement sections of the APHA-PHS Recommended Housing Main-
tenance and Occupancy Ordinance represent the first tentative effort
to grapple with the present housing crisis with the assistance of the
experience acquired by lawyers, judges, and public health officers in
the past sixteen years. For the Code to be meaningful, it must never be
allowed to become static, but must be subjected to periodic review,
frequent revision, and constant improvement.
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